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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its DE-
PARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
UNITED GEOPHYSICAL COMPANY, a 
Foreign Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
11362 
This is an action by the Utah State Division of 
Fish and Game, the Plaintiff and appellant, against 
the United Geophysical Company, Defendant and 
respondent. The Plaintiff brought an action to re-
cover damages for the killing of fish at Bear Lake, 
Utah, arising from the detonation of explosives by 
Defendant at Bear Lake. The Plaintiff's action was 
based on theory of breach of contract and detri-
mental reliance upon representations made by De-
fendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In early 1963, the Defendant, United Geophysi-
cal Company, contacted the Utah State Division of 
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Fish and Game to obtain permission to conduct 
underwater detonations in Flaming Gorge Reservoir 
and in Bear Lake. The wording of one of the letters 
addressed to Director Crane, requesting such per-
mission is as follcws: 
Dear Sir: 
"United ElectroDynamics, Inc., under contract to 
the the United States Geological Survey, is engaged 
in studying seismic propogation paths and regional 
travel times in the western United States as a part 
of the VELA UNIFORM Program of the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense. 
In conjunction with this work, chemical explosions 
will be detonated at several places in this region 
and the seismic waves generated by these explosions 
will be recorded at various distances. 
This is a request for permission to use Flaming 
Gorge Reservoir as one of the shot locations. We 
also wish to use Bear Lake. The site selected is at 
Jarvies Canyon, approximately 7 miles upstream 
from the dam. Four or five shots would be fired on 
consecutive days, the maximum charge size for any 
one shot being 6,000 pounds. The program is ex-
pected to start May 22, 1968, and continue until 
May 25 or 26, 1968. 
United ElectroDynamics, Inc., assumes responsi-
bility and any resulting liabilities entailed in the 
use of this reservoir as a shot location. 
Permission has been obtained from the Chief En-
gineer, Bureau of Reclamation, United States De-
partment of Interior, to use Flaming Gorge Reser-
voir as a shot location. Any game fish killed as a 
result of these explosions would be re-stocked by 
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United ElcctroDynamics, Inc., in a manner .that is 
agreeable to the Utah Fish and Game Department. 
Yours truly, 
Orville Strozier, Project Manager 
Engineering Geophysics Department 
United Geo Measurements Division 
This letter was one of several received by the 
Plaintiff from either the United Geophysical Com-
pany or the United States Geological Services. The 
Defendant was engaged in the detonation of ex-
plosives and the recording of seismographic read-
ings throughout the United States on a contract with 
the Geological Services. The Defendants represent-
ed, as is shown by the contents of the letter, that 
they agreed to "assume responsibility and any re-
sulting liabilities entailed in the use of this reservoir 
as a shot location." The Defendant further stated that 
any game fish killed as a result of these explosions 
would be restocked by United ElectroDynamics, 
Inc., in a manner that is agreeable to the Utah State 
Division of Fish and Game Department. 
Based upon these and other representations 
made by the Defendant the Utah State Division of 
Fish and Game Commission granted permission to 
the Defendant to conduct the detonations at Bear 
Lake and Flaming Gorge Reservoir. As a direct .re-
sult of these explosions a substantial number of in-
digenous Peak-Nosed Bonneville Cisco were killed 
and some Lake Trout or Mackinaw and Whitefish 
were also killed. 
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In reliance upon the representations, agree-
ments, and promises made by the Defendant, the 
Plaintiff requested compensation in terms of money 
for the killing and destruction of fish at Bear Lake; 
and the Defendant refused to pay, claiming among 
other things, that no contract had been entered into 
for the payment of damages and that any representa-
tions made by the Defendant was limited to Flam-
ing Gorge Reservoir, and did not apply to Bear Lake. 
Upon the Defendant's refusal to pay, the Plaintiff 
demanded that the Defendants restock fish in Bear 
Lake in a manner suitable to the Plaintiffs. The De-
fendant also refused to restock in a manner suitable 
to Plaintiff's claim. The Plaintiff, therefore, initiated 
action, based upon contract and detrimental re-
liance made by the Defendants, in an effort to ob-
tain damages for the killing and destruction of the 
fish. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DE-
FENDANT, AND THE PLEADINGS, FILES, RECORDS, 
AND EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT ESTABLISHES 
SUFFICIENT ISSUES TO BE HEARD RY THE TRIER 
OF FACTS. 
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was based upon the following alleged defects in 
Plain tiff's case: 
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1. No contract existed between the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant regarding the assumption of lia-
bility by the Plaintiff in its use of Bear Lake as a site 
to detonate explosives. 
2. If a contract existed between the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant regarding the use of Bear Lake 
as one of the sites to conduct the Defendant's ex-
periments, the contract is impossible of perform-
ance because of the peculiarity of the fish involved, 
and the difficulty to assess market values of the 
Cisco Fish and the Whitefish defeats the Plaintiff's 
claim for damages. 
3. If the contract existed between the parties 
in reference to Bear Lake, the contract was too am-
biguous to require the Defendant to perform its obli-
gations. 
The State of Utah, by and through its Division 
of Fish and Game is not entitled to br]ng a lawsuit 
as owners of the fish destroyed. 
5. Cisco Fish is not a game fish and the con-
tract was limited to compensation for destruction of 
game fish. 
6. No injury was sustained by the State of 
Utah. 
The arguments submitted by the Defendant 
enumerated as numbers l, 2, and 3, which relate to 
the question of contract and interpretation of con-
tract, will be answered together under one heading; 
and the arguments submitted by the Defendant 
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shown as numbers 4, 5, and 6 will be answered in-
dividually. 
Contracts 
Plaintiff does not rely solely upon the letter from 
Defendant dated May 9, 1963, as the entire contract. 
First, there appears to be substantial confusion in 
Defendant's own opinion as to exactly what its writ-
ten contract in the letter of May 9, 1963, does mean. 
Defendant now contends that the letter-contract re-
fers only to Flaming Gorge Reservoir, yet the letter 
specifically states that "We also wish to use Bear 
Lake." Defendant now contends the letter-contract 
refers only to restocking any game fish killed as a 
result of these explosions, yet the letter also "as-
sumes responsibility and any resulting liabilities en-
tailed in the use of this reservoir as a shot location." 
Obviously, on its face the letter of May 9, 1963, 
is ambiguous and confusing. It could not possibly 
form the written instrument embodying all aspects 
of the parties' agreement, necessary for the applica-
tion of the parol evidence rule. It is well established 
that before there can be a valid application of the 
parol evidence rule, there must be in existence, a 
writing which is susceptible to interpretation as to 
what exactly it means. 
"No parol evidence that is offered can be said to 
vary or contradict a writing until by process of 
interpretation it is determined that the writing 
means." Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 579 (1960). 
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The Utah Court has said, referring to a written con-
tract assignment: 
"Whenever uncertainty or ambiguity exists with 
respect thereto it is proper for the Court to con-
sider all the facts and circumstances, including the 
word and actions of the parties forming the back-
ground of the transaction." Radley vs. Smith, 6 Utah 
2nd 314, 313 P. 2nd 465 (1967). 
It seems obvious then that all communications 
and correspondence must be referred to in order to 
interpret the terms of the agreement entered into 
and that when this is done, Defendant agreed to as-
sume full responsibility for damages arising out of 
the use of Bear Lake and Flaming Gorge Reservoir 
as shot sites for their study. 
Secondly, the evidence is undisputed that 
sometime subsequent to the receipt of the May 9, 
1963, letter the Defendant's agent, in a telephone 
conversation with the then Fish and Game Director, 
Harold S. Crane, gave extensive verbal assurances 
that losses in Bear Lake would be minimal and that, 
in any event, Defendant would assume full respon-
sibility for any lesses. (See deposition of Harold S. 
Crane, Page 9, lines 25 forward.) It is certainly well 
established that the parol evidence rule does not 
relate to and d'.Jes not prevent proof of oral contracts 
entered into subsequent to the formal written con-
tract, varying or discharging the written agreement. 
(See 3 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 632 (3rd Edition); 
Simpson Handbook on the Law of Contracts, Sec. 63, 
(1954). 
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If, as the Defenda11t contends on one hand, no 
agreement was entered into with regard to the dam-
age done in Bear Lalce jn the letter of May 9, 1963, 
then the subsequent conversations between De-
fendant's agent and Director Crane, constituted a 
separate oral cor~tract. Defendant rnay no~ e~:c\1c11. 
these convers.::1tions from the contract on parol 
grounds and still contend that no agreernent vv1:i::; 
made. Obviously, such an agreement was made be-
cause Defendant vvent ahead with its blasting. The 
agreement contained in the letter of May 9, 1963, is 
either modified by the subsequent conversations t0 
include both greater assurances and assurances as 
to Bear Lake or the con'rersations comprise a sepa-
rate oral contract relating to Bear Lake alone. 
The rule is that subsequent agreements may be 
shown by parol evidence and are not barred or 
rendered ineffective by a prior writing. (See 3 Wil-
liston on Contracts, Sec. 632 (3rd Edition); 3 Corbin 
on Contracts Sec. 594, (1960). 
The Defendant may not have its cake and eat it 
both since it is inconceivable that Plaintiff would 
consent to debnation of Twelve Thousand (12,000) 
Pounds of high explosives in any fishery waters of 
the State of Utah without assurances regarding pos 
sible damage to the fishery involved. In fact, the 
Plaintiff did so only on the assurances of the United 
States Government and Defendant; first, that De-
fendant was a reputable and honorable concern; 
and second, that Defendant would assume full re-
sponsibility for all_ res11lting damages. Defendant 
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should not now be heard to say that this reliance 
was unwairanted in both regards. 
Finally, it would seem ironical if a party were 
permitted to take advantage of ambiguity created by 
him to defeat a contract which he has benefitted 
from. However, the decisions clearly show that a 
party may not use ambiguity created by him to im-
munize himself against an action for redress of a 
breach of contract. In l'v1aw vs. Noble, 354 P. 2nd 121, 
10 Utah 2nd 440, the Ccurt stated: 
"We are in agreement with the recognized rule 
urged by the Defendants that where there is un-
certainty or ambiguity the contract should be 
strictly construed against him who draws it." 
If the contract is in fact ambiguous as claimed 
by the Defendartts such ambiguity should be con-
strued against it as the drafter or the proposer of the 
contract. 
Valuation Of Property Having No Market Vaiue 
Because Of Its Peculiar Nature. 
The Defendant contends, among other things, 
that the Plaintiff's case must fail because of the im-
possibility of determining damages of the fish killed 
due to the peculiar nature of the peak-nosed Bonne-
-v-ill_.e, Cisco, the Rodcy Mountain Whitefish, and the 
Lake Trout or Mackinaw, and because these fish 
0re not ordinarily scld on the market and, therefore, 
h::ive no established market value. 
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The Courts have long since established a rule 
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however, which permits a party to testify as to a.c 
tual, intrinsic or subjective values where the value 
of the item, because of its peculiarity, cannot be as-
sessed by the ordinary rule of market value. 
The Utah precedent was apparently set in 
Kamas Security Company vs. Taylor, 226 P. 2nd 11 l, 
119 Utah 241. In that case the Utah Supreme Court, 
in permitting the lov1rer Court to assess damages 
on the basis of intrinsic value, stated: 
"The mere fact that the market value could not be 
shown by reason of the want of any listing on the 
Stock Exchange, and that there was only occasional 
transfer of this type of stock could not preclude 
Plaintiff from recovering judgment for more than 
nominal damap.-e. 1'he trial court was entitled to 
make a finding of value based on intrinsic worth of 
the stock. Although market value is a general cri-
terion of value, it is not the sole criterion." 
The same rule was stated differently in Park vs. 
Moorman Manufacturing Company, et al., 241 P. 
2nd 914, 121 Utah 339. The Court in approving the 
use of a method of valuation, other than market 
value, stated: 
"A problem arises, however, where, as in this case, 
there is no market value of the property destroyed 
since laying hens above the age of five months are 
not generally available, and a market value must be 
arrived at by a process of computation. Hence, in 
order to determine the value of Plaintiff's loss, we 
must start with a base and compute the incidentals 
which would be included in a mC1rket price of the 
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destroyed object i.f it had been obtainable on the 
open market." 
This rule, a.s established by the Supreme Court 
of Utah, is a confirmation of the general rule ac-
cepted by all of our sister states. The general rule 
is clearly stated in 22 AM. JUR. 2nd 214, Damaqes. 
Section 249. 
"There are many instances in which the item of 
personal property destroyed, injured, or taken has 
no market value in the normal sense of that term. 
A family photograph, a specially designed machine, 
a manuscript, some lecture notes, and plans of a 
draftsman can be examples of items of personal 
property which have no market value beyond the 
value of the paper or material which went into their 
construction. These items are not bought and sold 
on the open market, and continued adherence to the 
rule of damages which allows recovery only for a de-
crease in 'market value' would result in awarding 
the Plaintiff only nominal damages even though the 
court is convinced that the injury is substantial. In 
this type of case, the concept of measuring damages 
by the market value of the item, destroyed, injured, 
or taken is often discarded by the courts. The rule 
most frequently adopted for these cases is to award 
either the 'actual' or 'intrinsic' value of the item or 
the 'value to the owner' of the item." 
The Riqht Of The Utah Division Of Fish And Game 
To Sue For Loss Or Destruction Of Fish. 
There is no merit to the contention that the State 
of Utah has no property rights in fish therein. The 
Utah State Legislature has expressly stated: 
"All Game and fish now and hereinafter within this 
state, not held by private ownership legally ac-
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quired, and which, for the purpose of this law, shall 
include all game animals, game birds, water fowl, 
fish, amphibians, and fur-bearing animals, men-
tioned in this law are expressly declared to be the 
property of the State, .... Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, 23-1-10. (Emphasis added) 
There should be little dispute that even with-
out a statutory declaration as to the ownership of 
wildlife, that all wildlife within each state are held 
in trust, by the state government, for the people of 
that state. Logically, the state agency which is re-
sponsible for the maintenance of the wildlife should 
be entitled to maintain an action in behalf of the pub-
lic of that state. 
Definition Of Game Fish 
Cisco fish have long been regarded as game 
fish by the Utah Fish and Game Department be-
cause they are members of the Whitefish family, 
Prosopium. See Sigler & Miller, Fishes of Utah, P. 
185, (1963). If this is not sufficient, then under the 
law of the State of Utah, the sole test of whether or 
not Cisco Fish are game fish is whether or not they 
have been so declared by the Utah State Fish and 
Game Commission. 
"Game fish means all species of Trout, Bass, Sal-
mon, Pike, Catfish, Crappie, Whitefish, Grayling, 
and such other species as may be declared game by 
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the Commission and which are not raised in private 
fish hatcheries." Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
23-1-9, Para. 11. (Emphasis added). 
Angling regulations and bag limits were set for 
Bonneville Cisco as game fish by the Utah Fish and 
Game Commission in its official proclamation dated 
December 23, 1959. (See Utah Fish and Game De-
partment. 1960, Angling Regulations. Para. A-3-c and 
A-3-h.) Any inquiry into the method of taking as a 
means of defining game fish would lead to the ab-
surd result that many species would sometimes be 
game fish and sometimes not, since many are fre-
quently legally taken by methods involving neither 
rod nor reel. 
Damages 
Whether or not the Cisco, Whitefish, or Lake 
Trout populations were damaged or their spawning 
beds injured are questions of fact upon which evi-
dence will be adduced at trial. The indisputable fact 
is that an exceedingly large number of game fish 
were killed by the Defendant's activities. The ques-
tion of whether or not the State of Utah suffered 
any damage by reason of Defendant's activities and 
if so, how much, are questions to be answered at 
trial and are not susceptible to disposition at pre-
trial proceedings. Surely the fish killed and de-
stroyed have va]ue, irrespective of the peculiar na-
14 
ture of the species. The determination of this ques-
tion is without doubt, a justiciable question of fact 
for a jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff submits that there is ample evi-
dence to show the following: 
1. That the Utah Division of Fish and Game, 
as Trustees of wildlife for the people of the State of 
Utah is entitled to sue for injury and destruction of 
the wildlife resources. To hold otherwise would be 
to deny the state's right to recover for illegal acqui-
sition of minerals, ores, gas, oil, or water rights on 
state lands. 
2. That a contract existed between the parties 
which consists of verbal as well as written repre-
sentations which is sufficient to determine the in-
tent of the parties. 
3. That the Plaintiff is entitled to show or at-
tempt to show what damages it suffered by show-
ing intrinsic or personal value. 
4. That all fish for which recovery or com-
pensation is souqht are game fish. 
The Plaintiff respectfully submits that there are 
numerous issues raised by the pleading which must 
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be disposed of by trial and that the trial court 
errored in granting the Defendant's Motion For 
Summary Judgment, and this case should be re-
manded to the District Court for trial of the issues. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
KENNETH M. HISATAKE 
Special Assistant to 
Attorney General 
481 South Third East, 
Suite 102 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
